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Abstract—LTE is well on its way to becoming the primary
cellular standard, due to its performance and low cost. Over
the next decade we will become dependent on LTE, which is
why we must ensure it is secure and available when we need it.
Unfortunately, like any wireless technology, disruption through
radio jamming is possible. This paper investigates the extent to
which LTE is vulnerable to intentional jamming, by analyzing the
components of the LTE downlink and uplink signals. The LTE
physical layer consists of several physical channels and signals,
most of which are vital to the operation of the link. By taking into
account the density of these physical channels and signals with
respect to the entire frame, as well as the modulation and coding
schemes involved, we come up with a series of vulnerability
metrics in the form of jammer to signal ratios. The “weakest
links” of the LTE signals are then identified, and used to establish
the overall vulnerability of LTE to hostile interference.
Index Terms—LTE, LTE security, jamming, interference
I. INTRODUCTION
LTE service is widely available in the United States and
other countries around the world. LTE is well on its way to
becoming the primary cellular standard, due to its performance
and low cost. In addition to everyday use, cellular networks
are often used to broadcast emergency information during
natural disasters and other crises. Over the next decade we
will become dependent on LTE, which is why we must ensure
it is secure and available when we need it. Unfortunately, like
any wireless technology, disruption through radio jamming is
possible.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the extent to
which LTE is vulnerable to jamming, and to derive metrics
in order to compare possible weak points in the downlink
and uplink signals. In order to derive metrics that represent
the effectiveness of different jamming techniques, we will
introduce two different symbols corresponding to the jammer-
to-signal ratio (J/S). J/SRE will correspond to a J/S when
only taking into account the specific subcarriers and OFDM
symbols (a.k.a. resource elements) being jammed. J/S averaged
over an entire frame will be referred to as J/SF . We will
limit the scope of this paper by only analyzing Frequency
Division Duplex (FDD) configured LTE, due to its widespread
use. However, much of the analysis included in this paper can
be applied to Time Division Duplex (TDD) as well.
The views expressed in the article are views of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense
or United States Government.
Attacks on LTE can be grouped into two broad categories;
Denial of Service (DOS) and information extracting. Jamming
attacks are typically used to cause DOS, while the area of cy-
ber security deals with attacks that extract information, cause
DOS, or both. There is very little openly available literature
related to attacks on LTE. The authors of [1] introduce the non-
access-stratum request attack, which causes DOS by flooding
the Home Subscriber Server (HSS). An attack designed to
cause degradation of service is described in [2], in which
an attacker sends fake buffer status reports to the eNodeB,
which causes the eNodeB to assign excessive resources to
users which don’t exist. The author of [3] analyzes OFDM
denial using barrage jamming, pilot tone jamming, and pilot
tone nulling. An overview of the security of LTE availability
is given in [4].
II. BACKGROUND OF LTE
Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiple Access (OFDMA)
is the multiple access scheme used in the LTE downlink [5].
OFDMA uses multiple carriers, which makes it effective in a
frequency selective channel. Each subcarrier carries a separate
stream of information, causing information to be mapped
in both the time and frequency domain. This leads to the
Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (OFDM) time-
frequency lattice, which is a two-dimensional grid used to
represent how information is mapped to both the subcarrier
and the OFDM symbol. In LTE, one subcarrier over one
OFDM symbol is called a resource element, and 12 con-
secutive subcarriers over 7 OFDM symbols are combined to
form a resource block, as shown in Figure 1. This method
of information mapping allows a jammer to selectively jam
information in both the time and frequency domain. Single
Carrier-Frequency Division Multiple Access (SC-FDMA) is
the multiple-access scheme selected for the LTE uplink [5].
LTE user devices are known as User Equipment (UE). The
UE accesses the LTE network by connecting to the eNodeB,
which acts as a base station.
III. VULNERABILITY OF LTE PHYSICAL CHANNELS
The following subsections investigate the various LTE
physical channels with the goal of finding the minimum
J/S required to cause the physical channel to be corrupted
beyond functionality. The J/S thresholds associated with the
physical channels are largely based on the modulation and
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Fig. 1. A Single LTE Resource Block
coding scheme used in each channel, and in each subsection
we approximate the Bit Error Rate (BER) or Block Error
Rate (BLER) required to cause a corrupt channel. The actual
BER/BLER threshold is based off of numerous factors on
many different layers, and would be best acquired empirically.
Table I highlights the parameters associated with each physical
channel [5], [6].
A. PDSCH and PUSCH (User Data)
The Physical Downlink Shared Channel (PDSCH) and
Physical Uplink Shared Channel (PUSCH) are used to transmit
user data to and from the eNodeB. These two channels utilize
adaptive modulation and coding, and undergo either QPSK,
16-QAM, or 64-QAM depending on the channel quality [5].
Both channels use turbo coding for forward error correction,
with a coding rate as low as 0.076 (when using rate-matching)
[7]. In the presence of an interferer, we will assume that the
modulation ratchets down to QPSK at 0.076 rate coding. The
authors of [8] analyze low-rate turbo codes using OFDM and
SC-FDMA in a typical urban channel. At a coding rate of 1/15,
an average SNR of around -7 dB results in a BLER of 0.1 [8].
Determining the exact effects of a 0.1 BLER on the PDSCH
and PUSCH is beyond the scope of this paper; however it is
predicted that this BLER will lead to an overwhelming amount
of retransmissions. We will therefore estimate the J/SRE
threshold for these physical channels to be 7 dB.
B. PCFICH (Downlink Control Format Indicator)
The Physical Control Format Indicator Channel (PCFICH)
is used to send the UE information regarding where the
Physical Downlink Control Channel (PDCCH) is located in
TABLE I
PHYSICAL CHANNEL MODULATION AND CODING SCHEMES
Channel Modulation Coding Coding Rate
PDSCH {4,16,64}-QAM Turbo Adaptive
PBCH QPSK Convolutional 1/48
PCFICH QPSK Block 1/16
PDCCH QPSK Convolutional 1/3
PHICH BPSK Repetition 1/3
PUSCH {4,16,64}-QAM Turbo Adaptive
PUCCH BPSK, QPSK Convolutional 1/3
PRACH ZC Sequences N/A N/A
the time-frequency lattice. Without successful decoding of this
information, the UE will not be able to decode the PDCCH.
The PDCCH contains information regarding UE resource
allocation, which is vital to the LTE service. Although it is
possible to jam the PDCCH directly, we will first analyze the
J/S threshold of the PCFICH.
The PCFICH appears in only one symbol per subframe,
and occupies 16 subcarriers. Jamming the PCFICH consists of
transmitting on top of the 16 subcarriers. The location of the
16 subcarriers is not static; it is determined by the eNodeB’s
complete cell ID [5]. This ID is carried in the PSS and
SSS, and therefore selectively jamming the PCFICH requires
the jammer to synchronize to both downlink synchronization
signals. This also limits a PCFICH jamming attack to a single
cell. Figure 2 includes an example FDD downlink frame
(left and center graphics), by displaying the color-coded time-
frequency lattice. The resource elements used for the PCFICH
are shown in blue.
The information carried on the PCFICH is a two bit indi-
cator, which is encoded using a block code of rate 1/16. Due
to the function of the PCFICH, successful jamming requires
transmitting at a high enough power to cause a BER near 0.5.
The authors of [9] use BPSK in an Additive White Gaussian
Noise (AWGN) channel to show that a soft-decision decoded
block code with rate 1/16 can be decoded at an SNR down to
-1.5 dB.
C. PUCCH (Uplink Control Channel)
The Physical Uplink Control Channel (PUCCH) is used to
send the eNodeB a variety of control information, includ-
ing scheduling requests, Hybrid Automatic Repeat Request
(HARQ) acknowledgements, and channel quality indicators.
The PUCCH is mapped to the resource blocks on the edges
of the system bandwidth, as shown in Figure 2. This allows
PUCCH jamming to be possible when the only a priori
knowledge is the LTE system bandwidth and center frequency.
For an uplink BW of 10 MHz, roughly 16 resource blocks (or
192 subcarriers) are allocated to the PUCCH [5]. Therefore,
PUCCH jamming requires jamming about 25% - 30% of the
uplink system bandwidth. The PUCCH is modulated with a
mix of BPSK and QPSK, and uses 1/3 rate convolutional
coding. It can be shown that BPSK under an AWGN channel
reaches a BER of 0.1 at around 2 dB of SNR, when using
soft-decision decoding at rate 1/3 [10].
D. PBCH (Downlink Broadcast Channel)
After synchronizing with the PSS and SSS, the UE receives
more information about the cell by decoding the Master
Information Block (MIB), which is transmitted on the Physical
Broadcast Channel (PBCH). The MIB contains information
essential for initial access to a cell [11]. It consists of 14
bits that contain the downlink system bandwidth, the PHICH
size, and information allowing frame synchronization. It is
mapped to the center 72 subcarriers, and appears in the first
subframe of every frame. The PBCH is transmitted using
QPSK, and uses a 16-bit CRC as a form of error detection.
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Fig. 2. LTE Downlink Frame (Left/Center) and Uplink Frame (Right)
It also uses a special channel coding scheme that creates four
individually self-decodable units, each with rate 1/12, but all
four units can be decoded together for a coding rate of 1/48.
This is accomplished using a mixture of repetition coding and
convolutional coding. An uncoded QPSK signal reaches a BER
of 0.1 at roughly 0 dB of SNR in an AWGN channel, and the
PBCH coding scheme does not provide a significant gain at
this value of SNR [9]. We will therefore estimate the J/SRE
threshold for the PBCH to be 0 dB.
E. PHICH (Hybrid-ARQ Indicator Channel)
Downlink acknowledgements (ACK/NACK) are sent on
the Physical Hybrid-ARQ Indicator Channel (PHICH). The
PHICH uses BPSK with repetition-3 coding [5]. BPSK using
repetition-3 coding in a fading channel reaches a BER of 0.1
at about 2 dB of SNR [9], leading to a J/SRE threshold of
roughly -2 dB.
IV. VULNERABILITY OF LTE PHYSICAL LAYER SIGNALS
A. Primary and Secondary Synchronization Signals
Detecting the PSS is the first step a UE takes in accessing
a cell. The PSS signal is constructed from a Zadoff-Chu
(ZC) sequence, which are complex-valued sequences that have
constant amplitude. An odd-length ZC sequence is given by
xq[k] = exp
[
−j piqk(k + 1)
N
]
(1)
where N is the length of the sequence and q is the ZC
sequence root index [12]. The PSS uses a sequence length
of 63, and there are three PSS sequences used in LTE, usually
corresponding to one of three sectors.
A jamming attack against the PSS would require a fairly
high J/SRE , because the PSS is designed to be detected
at high interference levels, so that the UE can also detect
neighboring cells. A more effective method of corrupting the
PSS would be to simply transmit all three PSS sequences, thus
spoofing the synchronization signal. If the jammer’s received
power at the UE is greater than the eNodeB’s (a J/SRE over
0 dB), then the UE is most likely going to synchronize to the
bogus PSS. The actual detection algorithm is left up to the
vendor, so we will assume that a J/SRE of 3 dB is enough
to cause the PSS subsystem to fail nearly all of the time. PSS
spoofing will not immediately cause DOS; it will prevent new
UEs from accessing the cell(s) and cause UEs in idle mode to
reselect a bogus cell. While it is possible for the blacklisting
mechanism implemented in the UE to effectively ignore the
bogus signals, we will assume the system gets “confused”
when it detects a valid PSS with no associated SSS and does
not know how to deal with it.
Detecting the SSS is the second required step in accessing
an LTE cell. The SSS provides frame timing information, cell
group ID, cyclic prefix length, and TDD/FDD configuration. It
is a BPSK modulated signal made up of m-sequences. Simply
jamming the SSS is not effective for the same reason as jam-
ming the PSS, and spoofing the SSS requires synchronizing
with the target cell, because the UE expects the SSS to be in a
certain location. For these reasons, SSS jamming and spoofing
is left out of the final comparison.
B. Downlink Reference Signals
In order for an OFDM receiver to estimate the channel and
perform frequency-domain equalization, there must be known
symbols periodically transmitted. Although these known sym-
bols are often referred to as pilots or reference symbols,
in the LTE specification they are called Reference Signals
(RSs). In the downlink, RSs are multiplexed in both time and
frequency, as shown in Figure 2. RSs occupy roughly 14%
of the resource elements in a frame. The location of the RSs
in time and frequency is based on the cell ID. All RSs are
QPSK modulated, and use a length-31 Gold sequence that is
initialized with a value based on the cell ID.
It is shown in [13] and [3] that jamming a subcarrier
that contains RSs leads to a higher BER than one that only
contains data. A RS jamming attack requires detecting the
target eNodeB’s PSS and SSS in order to retrieve the cell ID.
However, it does not require estimating the channels involved,
due to the long symbol duration (71 microseconds). Even if
there is 5 miles between the jammer and UE, there would only
be a propagation delay of 27 microseconds. To compensate for
this delay, the jammer would only have to start transmitting a
fraction of a symbol early.
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF VULNERABILITIES
Jamming Method # of REs % of REs J/SRE Synch. Required Complexity J/SF
Barrage Jamming 84000 100% -2 dB No Very Low -2 dB
RS Jamming 4000 5% 4 dB Yes High -9 dB
Center 6 Resource Blocks Jamming 10080 12% -2 dB No Very Low -11 dB
PSS Spoofing 378 0.45% 3 dB No Medium -20 dB
PCFICH Jamming 160 0.2% 1.5 dB Yes High -25 dB
PUCCH Jamming 21000 25% -2 dB No Low -8 dB
A RS jamming simulation performed in [3] shows that
when using a QPSK signal and an SNR of 10 dB, an overall
J/S (J/SF ) of -5 dB causes a BER of 0.1. The simulated
system uses a pilot density of 1/8, resulting in a J/S of 4 dB
when only considering the jammed resource elements (i.e. the
value of J/SRE). An 8-tap channel is used, and the signal is
generated with a cyclic prefix length of 1/8 and a 256-point
FFT. Although the simulated system is not exactly the same
as LTE, it provides a reasonable approximation of J/SRE .
V. COMPARISON OF VULNERABILITIES
In order to compare the extent of each vulnerability, we use
a system bandwidth of 10 MHz (this equates to 50 resource
blocks). Table II lists the various forms of jamming, along
with key metrics. Jamming techniques that do not perform
better than barrage jamming are left off this table. Note that
jamming the center 6 resource blocks means jamming the
PBCH without time synchronization, using a 100% duty cycle
waveform.
The second and third columns of Table II show the number
and percent of resource elements per frame that must be
jammed in each attack. The minimum J/SRE column shows
the J/SRE required to cause immediate denial of the channel
or signal, which is a value estimated in the analysis of each
section, and is meant to be a rough estimate. Two of the attacks
require the jammer to maintain time domain synchronization
with target cells, using the PSS and SSS. The complexity
metric is based on the amount of synchronization required and
the transmitted waveform. The “very low” complexity attacks
simply involve transmitting AWGN into a continuous band.
The J/SF metric is the overall J/S when taking into account
the entire LTE frame, and is given by
J/SF = J/SRE
NRE
20NsymbNscNRB
(2)
where NRE is the number of resource elements associated
with the physical channel or signal, NRB is the number of
resource blocks used in the downlink or uplink signal, Nsymb
is the number of OFDM symbols in a slot, and Nsc is the
number of subcarriers per resource block. This calculation
assumes a uniform power spectral density across the LTE
downlink or uplink signal. From the perspective of the jammer,
a lower J/SF is better.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we analyzed the vulnerability of LTE to
jamming by investigating the various physical channels and
signals within LTE. Using barrage jamming as a baseline,
we have shown that much more effective jamming methods
can be realized by exploiting the protocols of LTE. In order
to compare several methods, we derived metrics related to
effectiveness and complexity for each one. When considering
how many forms of jamming are more effective than barrage
jamming, it is clear that LTE is extremely vulnerable to
adversarial jamming. In particular, the PCFICH and PUCCH
are weak points in the downlink and uplink signal respectively.
This is not a surprising result, considering LTE was not
designed to be a military communication system. However,
with the rapid growth of mobile devices, LTE is going to be
a highly relied upon technology.
REFERENCES
[1] D. Yu and W. Wen, “Non-access-stratum request attack in e-utran,”
in Computing, Communications and Applications Conference (Com-
ComAp), 2012, Jan 2012, pp. 48 – 53.
[2] D. Forsberg, H. Leping, K. Tsuyoshi, and S. Alanara, “Enhancing
security and privacy in 3gpp e-utran radio interface,” in Personal, Indoor
and Mobile Radio Communications, 2007. PIMRC 2007. IEEE 18th
International Symposium on, Sept 2007, pp. 1 –5.
[3] T. Clancy, “Efficient ofdm denial: Pilot jamming and pilot nulling,” in
Communications (ICC), 2011 IEEE International Conference on, June
2011, pp. 1 – 5.
[4] R. P. Jover, “Security attacks against the availability of lte mobility
networks: Overview and research directions,” Tech. Rep.
[5] 3GPP Technical Report 36.211, ‘Physical Channels and Modulation’,
www.3gpp.org.
[6] 3GPP Technical Report 36.212, ‘Multiplexing and channel coding’,
www.3gpp.org.
[7] 3GPP Technical Report 36.213, ‘Physical layer procedures’,
www.3gpp.org.
[8] K. Miwa, N. Miki, T. Kawamura, and M. Sawahashi, “Performance of
decision-directed channel estimation using low-rate turbo codes for dft-
precoded ofdma,” in Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC Spring),
2012 IEEE 75th, 2012, pp. 1–5.
[9] J. G. Proakis, Digital communications, 4th ed. New York, New York:
McGraw Hill, 2000.
[10] E. Malkamaki and H. Leib, “Evaluating the performance of convolu-
tional codes over block fading channels,” Information Theory, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 45, no. 5, pp. 1643–1646, 1999.
[11] M. Baker and T. Moulsley, “Downlink physical data and control
channels,” in LTE, The UMTS Long Term Evolution: From Theory to
Practice, 2nd ed., S. Sesia, I. Toufik, and M. Baker, Eds. Chichester,
West Sussex, United Kingdom: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2011, ch. 9.
[12] F. Tomatis and S. Sesia, “Synchronization and cell search,” in LTE,
The UMTS Long Term Evolution: From Theory to Practice, 2nd ed.,
S. Sesia, I. Toufik, and M. Baker, Eds. Chichester, West Sussex, United
Kingdom: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2011, ch. 7.
[13] C. Patel, G. Stuber, and T. Pratt, “Analysis of ofdm/mc-cdma under
channel estimation and jamming,” in Wireless Communications and
Networking Conference, 2004. WCNC. 2004 IEEE, vol. 2, March 2004,
pp. 954 – 958 Vol.2.
